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Church and State
Father Joaquin Bernas, SJ
I am glad that one
of my readers has expressed his unhappiness about my views on church and state.
He has given me a chance to make him happy, or perhaps more unhappy.
In a piece which he
entitled “Noted constitutionalist Bernas misses again” he particularly laments
that I seem to have failed or chosen not to see the fundamental principle that
the “separation of church and state shall be inviolable.” He seems to forget
that, although this is a principle that came to us with the American regime,
the sentence found in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, only
appeared for the first time in the 1973 Constitution. And I have always told my
students that this sentence in Article II is a superfluity. It adds nothing to
what has been elaborated in other parts of the Constitution even before 1973
and in a long line of Philippine and American jurisprudence.
The phrase,
incidentally, appears under the Declaration of Principles. They are just that,
principles which guide government in the conduct of affairs. The principle of
separation of church and state commands government about what it may not do
about churches. It is not a guide for the conduct of private individuals nor of
the Church. The rule of conduct for the Church is in Canon Law.
Moreover, I usually
avoid the use of the phrase “separation of church and state” and its cousin
“wall of separation” because they can lead to exaggerated notions suggesting
that there can be no contact between church and state. How can there be no
contact when they live in the same world? Hence, I prefer to use the original
language of the Constitution which speaks of “non-establishment of religion.”
But even
“non-establishment” has been read in varying ways by jurisprudence. At one end,
relevant to American federalism but not to the Philippine unitary system, is
the view that the clause merely insulates state policy on religion from federal
interference. At the other end are formulations of how the government may
legislate on matters that touch on religion. One reading says that the
non-establishment clause prohibits the state from passing "laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Other
jurisprudential readings nuance this more carefully to say that (1) the
non-establishment clause prohibits only direct support of institutional
religion but not benefits incidentally accruing to churches and church agencies
through support given to members; (2) both direct and indirect aid to religion
are prohibited especially if the support involves preference of one religion
over another or preference of religion over irreligion (3) state aid to the
secular goals of religious institutions may be given provided it will not
involve “excessive entanglement with religion.” In other words, there is no
simplistic reading of the non-establishment clause or separation of church and
state.
My reader also
laments that I support the “amazing unconstitutional act, that a prelate, say,
a cardinal, could run for public office.” What is amazing, however, is the
contrary view. The Constitution itself says: “No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” Prohibiting a priest
or cardinal from running for office means imposing on them a religious test for
the exercise of their political rights. That is a constitutional no-no.
My reader also
teaches that there is violation of separation of church and state when “public
officials would not decline a Red Mass, or the bishops are unable to restrain
themselves from offering it to the politicians.” He would require our public
officials to be irreligious and he would curtail the right of bishops to
promote religious values.
This brings me to a
basic principle that must not be forgotten when reading the Constitution. It is
this, that, for the state, the Constitution sets up the structures and powers
of government and enumerates some non-inherent powers; but for the individual
person it is a guarantee of fundamental rights. The Bill of Rights, where the
non-establishment provision is found, is a limitation on the powers of the
state but a guarantee of the rights of individuals. In the matter of religion,
this is obvious. The Constitution commands the state not to establish any
religion (no law shall be passed
respecting an establishment of religion) but it guarantees the right of the
individual to the free exercise of religious profession and worship. One of the
purposes, in fact, of the invention of “non-establishment” is the protection of
individuals from oppressive state religions. Non-establishment, in other words,
is in service of free exercise. Hence, when there is conflict between the two,
jurisprudence favors free exercise. For instance, our Supreme Court has spoken
of “benevolent neutrality” in approaching religious conflicts.
My reader also cites the example of revered elders in Constitutional Law – Recto, TaƱada, Carreon, Cruz. There are others too. I am certain that they are for non-establishment and against religious abuses; but I am equally certain that they will defend the free exercise of religion.
My reader also cites the example of revered elders in Constitutional Law – Recto, TaƱada, Carreon, Cruz. There are others too. I am certain that they are for non-establishment and against religious abuses; but I am equally certain that they will defend the free exercise of religion.
6 December 2010
Note: I added the link of the said letter referred to by Father Bernas. You can find Father Bernas' article here. --jsalvador
Note: I added the link of the said letter referred to by Father Bernas. You can find Father Bernas' article here. --jsalvador
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